A look at the origins of violence under the political condition known as “late republic.”
Read Part 1: Vigilante Senators
The circumstances which have led to the conflict in which we find ourselves today are as infinitesimal as are the circumstances of any conflict with respect to the genesis of conflict among thinking primates. As a result, it should come as no surprise that any history written on such subjects must inevitably accept certain narratives in order to explain the circumstances in question. For an example, how the ideological leanings of key political demographics align with particular a/theological backgrounds cannot be counted as a predictor of human behavior, but it does provide insights into past patterns of human behavior. However critical this information may be to the study of conflict, it remains part of the ethereal mystery of human nature, which can only be commented upon rather than used to extrapolate or quantify data. Those latter tasks are the realm of history and the inevitable weakness of the historian.
The remote origins of our present conflict lies among the aftermath of the Civil War, a conflict itself turned cold rather than concluded with the failure of Reconstruction. The flaring of American-upon-American killing through the intervening century and a half should be understood as the underpinning of all conflict on the North American continent from colonization to the present. More directly, the confidence born from the victories in the World Wars has begun to wane in favor of a return to a more primitive form of social individualism, much of it defined by one’s economic and social strata. A perceived desire for retribution in lieu of past injuries has congealed around preexisting social fault-lines, propelling a general detachment among the individuals of each strata of society.
The institution of “conviction politics” and the moralization and indemnification of political identity coalesces around certain factions in society, of which the most extreme elements become notable. The moralization of the term patriot can be inferred to be a part of the context in which the attitudes of the subsequent Tea Party movement were formed, and in turn, the context of the Tea Party served as the forge for sociopolitical factions like the Oathkeepers and Proud Boys, memorialized in their shared insignia and rhetoric. These extralegal factions were politically legitimized by their sponsorship among those in the Trump administration and the subsequent falsehoods made regarding election fraud in the following election. Such is the culmination of political factionalism, that they and the opponent coalescence around the term “Antifa,” that they should find themselves in the sort of street-battles familiar to those acquainted with the exploits of Clodius and Milo in ancient Rome. But where with greater distance the factionalism is more easily ascribed to the political will of strongmen, it is with vantage of more recent hindsight that we see the truth of the matter. That the factionalism which underlies the collapse of republics is not directed in the way Caesar and Pompey are so portrayed by later historian, but is instead the consummation of sociocultural drivers and their sociopolitical champions. Where Caesar and Pompey are seen as the puppet-masters, they should instead be read as the stokers of preexisting fires in the vain effort to guide their will.
Here enters the economic question, for the stokers of these forces are more often than not also at their mercy. Wealth speaks most highly among all factors, for with wealth can be purchased favor; even amidst a great conflagration, fuel can be added in ways which spread the flame along a more desirous path. Such is the case when the moralizing forces in politics bring the workings of institutions to a grinding halt, that those who halt such workings through their moralization should resort to the destruction of those very institutions in the pursuit of their particular agenda. Economic might is the fuel from which such destruction feeds, and so it is likewise those who own their economic standing to the existing political institutions who nevertheless desire its disintegration. What is little understood by either of these two entities—often one and the same, as in the cases of Caesar and Pompey—is how such behavior affects the thinking of the common individual. Can it be said that the proponents of political violence in the republic of Caesar and Pompey gave birth to the narrative of its legitimacy through bloodshed in the proscriptions of the Triumvirs? It was then, at a time when the republic existed only in name, Roman society entertained the acceptability of open violence among the citizenry – a fact made manifest in waves of political cleansings which all but wiped out a generation. That these political proscriptions in turn mirrored an economic proscription is no accident, as both the one who kills the proscribed, and the other who issued the proscription, benefit from both forms of extralegal destruction. It is therefore apparent that the moralization of politics and political identity can only lead to an “us versus them” mentality, one in which fellow citizens are no longer seen as rivals but are instead perceived as the embodiment of all the ills of society, and therefore the target of proscription. Acceptability is created through detachment, a result of the inevitable bias of general opposition to all which is not familiar, strengthened through a deficit of exposure. The less familiar a person, the less they are perceived to be someone just like oneself. Violence thereby becomes inevitable, and therefore death becomes acceptable.
Surviving such ubiquitous destruction binds its survivors more powerfully to one another. Little wonder the regime which followed the era of civil wars begun by Caesar’s passage out of Gaul could remain so tightly held by only a handful of individuals and their network of associates. Those from the time before were only integrated as they themselves integrated politically to the new sociocultural alignment being directed by Octavian in the aftermath of eighteen years of bloodshed. Octavian himself would come to craft a change only possible by the passing of a generation since the beginning of the civil wars, and by then he was known as Augustus—and for the next generation, Augustus would be the only power which they knew. Those who remembered the old days were only spared because of their silence regarding that particular past, whether by appeasement or exile, and any rumbling which might fracture the peace forged through death would at once have been extinguished.
What then can be said for the present state?
The outbreak of our present conflict lies in the power of factionalism among the vested entities of the United States. The fissure opened through the falsehoods proponed by the losing side of the 2020 election, a fact not dissimilar to that which was opened by the opposition to the election of 1860; indeed, the legitimization of political leadership is arguably the single most important factor in the preservation of public confidence. When the authority of leadership is brought into question and the question’s veracity given social legitimacy through the support of political factions, the conditions for civil war have been met. What remains to be seen is what may trigger it, or whether it may be avoided. The Pennsylvanian rebels of the early 1790s and the actions of persons like John Brown across Kansas in the 1850s are themselves variously identified as flashpoints and extensions of civil war in opposition to the authority of political institutions. In this case, conflicts such as these should be seen not as a settling of the conflict in question, but as individual flashpoints in a larger undercurrent of internecine conflict.
Further reading: Our Cold Civil War
See also: Seek Rivalry, Not Enmity


Great content! Keep up the good work!